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INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the war on terror in 2001, the military has 
called hundreds of thousands of reservists to active duty.
1
  Fighting the war 
on terror has required the largest deployment of American service men and 
women since the Vietnam War.
2
  Reserve components now comprise about 
half of the U.S. military’s forces.
3
  These reservists have been required to 
put their civilian lives on hold and step off of the corporate ladder while 
they fulfill their military orders. 
Unfortunately, many of these men and women sustain disabling 
injuries during their service.  From 2001 to 2008, the number of disabled 
veterans in the U.S. increased by over twenty-five percent to 2.9 million, 
and that number has continued to increase.
4
  In the war on terror, the 
wounded-to-killed ratio is now 16:1, the highest ratio in U.S. history.
5
  
 
 1.  David S. Loughran, Jacob Alex Klerman & Bogdan Savych, THE EFFECT OF 
RESERVE ACTIVATIONS AND ACTIVE-DUTY DEPLOYMENTS ON LOCAL EMPLOYMENT DURING 
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 1 (Rand Corp. Technical Report Series, 2006), available 
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR321.pdf. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  151 CONG. REC. 25,308 (2005) (statement of Rep. Pombo) (noting that “National 
Guard members and members of Reserve Forces comprise about 46 percent of our total 
available military manpower”). 
 4.  Jennifer Kerr, Number of Disabled Vets Up With Iraq, Afghan Wars, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2008, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/05/11/number-of-disabled-vetsu_n_101183.html; see 
also Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Profile America Facts for Features (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb1
0-ff21.html (indicating that the number of veterans with a disability connected to service in 
the armed forced was 3.3 million as of 2009). 
 5.  See Linda Bilmes, Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: The Long-term 
Costs of Providing Veterans Medical Care and Disability Benefits 2 (John F. Kennedy Sch. 
of Gov’t Faculty Research, Working Paper No. RWP07-001, 2007), available at 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=4329&typ
e=FN&PersonId=177 (explaining that in Vietnam, there were 2.6 injuries per fatality, and in 
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Because of medical and technological advances, “soldiers are surviving 
injuries that would have killed them in previous wars . . . [and] are 
returning back to the United States with short-[term] and long-term 
disabilities.”
6
 
When disabled reservists return home, they face the challenge of 
reentering the workforce.  The Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) protects the rights of these returning 
veterans to be reemployed in the same position that they vacated to perform 
their military service, or a position of like status, seniority, and pay.  Under 
USERRA, employers have an obligation to make reasonable efforts to help 
returning veterans become qualified to perform the duties of the 
reemployment position.
7
 
Employers are obligated under USERRA to make reasonable efforts to 
accommodate disabled veterans and reintegrate them into the workforce. 
Those obligations may be excused if they would impose an “undue 
hardship” on the employer.
8
  Because of the way that USERRA borrows 
concepts from the Americans with Disabilities Act, the language describing 
“undue hardship” under USERRA is likely to be construed in the same way 
that it is under the ADA.
9
  In cases arising under the ADA, courts have 
interpreted and applied the term “undue hardship” in ways that limit 
employers’ obligations to accommodate employees’ disabilities.  But 
despite the important ramifications that “undue hardship” may have in 
requiring employers to reemploy returning veterans, courts still have not 
interpreted the term or applied it in the context of USERRA.
 
In this 
comment, I contend that the similar definitions of the term “undue 
hardship” under the ADA and USERRA, the similar general purpose of the 
two acts, and the lack of consensus among government agencies as to how 
“undue hardship” should be interpreted under USERRA make it likely that 
courts will apply ADA case law when interpreting the term under 
USERRA.  I argue that such importation would be problematic for four 
reasons (1) the terms that the undue hardship provision delimits in each 
act—“reasonable  accommodation” under the ADA, and “reasonable 
efforts” under USERRA—have different meanings and carry different 
burdens of proof; (2) “undue hardship” analysis under the ADA is 
 
World Wars I and II, there were fewer than two wounded service men for every soldier 
killed). 
 6.  Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1081, 1097 (2010). 
 7.  20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012). 
 8. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303(10) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(i) (2012) (defining 
“reasonable efforts” by an employer as “actions, including training provided by an employer 
that do not place an undue hardship on the employer”). 
 9.  Kevin G. Martin, Employment Law, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 499, 512 (1995). 
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inextricably entwined with “reasonable accommodation” analysis, and 
courts construe those terms in ways that limit plaintiffs’ recovery; (3) 
administrative guidance, while unclear, suggests that ADA case law should 
not be imported to interpret undue hardship; and (4) giving a broad 
interpretation to undue hardship would run counter to USERRA’s 
underlying purpose.  To import undue hardship from the ADA to USERRA 
would, in essence, make the term a Trojan horse; the gift of useful guidance 
would in practice undermine USERRA’s protections for disabled soldiers.  
I argue that courts should instead construe the term narrowly under 
USERRA.  While it is beyond the scope of this comment to solve the 
puzzle of how courts should interpret USERRA’s undue hardship 
provision, I propose that USERRA’s affirmative defense of “changed 
circumstances” provides a better model than ADA case law for how courts 
should interpret the undue hardship provision. 
I.  USERRA: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Reemploying service members upon their return from duty has a long-
standing history.  Congress first promulgated reemployment protections for 
veterans prior to America’s entry into WWII.
10
  As the U.S. military has 
become increasingly dependent on reservist forces, the nature of 
reemployment protections has changed.  After the Vietnam War, Congress 
repealed the draft and initiated a “Total Force Policy,” by which it came to 
rely heavily on America’s peacetime volunteer force, including the 
Reserves and National Guard.
11
  In response to this changed military 
strategy, Congress also codified new veteran reemployment protections in 
the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (VRRA).
12
  The 
VRRA protected reservists’ right to reemployment and was meant to aid 
soldiers’ reentry into the workforce.
13
  Despite the protections of the 
VRRA, however, many soldiers lost their jobs after serving in the Gulf 
War.
14
  Congress was concerned that lack of protection would lead fewer 
people to enroll in the Reserves and National Guard and could distract 
 
 10.  Andy P. Fernandez, The Need for the Expansion of Military Reservists’ Rights in 
Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 859, 869 (2002) (describing the passage of the Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940). 
 11.  Id. at 861. 
 12.  Anthony H. Green, Reemployment Rights Under the Uniform Services Employment 
and Reemployment Act (USERRA): Who’s Bearing the Cost?, 37 IND. L. REV. 213, 218 
(2003). 
 13.  Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again, Will He Be Welcome 
at Work?, 35 PEPP. L.  REV. 247, 252-53 (2008). 
 14.  Id. at 254. 
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those fighting abroad.
15
 
In order to “clarify, simplify, and, where necessary, strengthen the 
existing veterans’ employment and reemployment rights provisions” under 
the VRRA, Congress passed USERRA in 1994.
16
    USERRA’s purpose is 
threefold: 
(1) to encourage non-career service in the uniformed services 
by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian 
careers and employment which can result from such service; 
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons 
performing service in the uniformed services as well as to their 
employers, their fellow employees, and their communities by 
providing for the prompt reemployment of such persons upon 
their completion of such service; and 
(3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because of their 
service in the uniformed services.
17
 
In furtherance of this purpose, USERRA creates an entitlement for service 
members to be reemployed upon their return from uniformed service.
18
 
For service members to qualify for benefits under USERRA, their 
discharge must not be characterized as dishonorable or bad conduct, a 
dismissal, or being dropped from the rolls.
19
  Section 4312 of USERRA 
provides that members of the armed forces or reserves who (1) properly 
notify employers of their need to take a uniformed service-related absence; 
(2) take a cumulative absence of no more than five years; and (3) properly 
reapply to work, are entitled to reemployment.
20
  Additionally, USERRA 
provides that an individual who returns from a period of service greater 
than ninety days shall be reemployed “in the position of employment in 
which the person would have been employed if the continuous employment 
of such person with the employer had not been interrupted by such service, 
or a position of like seniority, status and pay, the duties of which the person 
is qualified to perform.”
21
  These same entitlements extend to service 
members who incur or aggravate an injury or disability during the course of 
 
 15.  See 139 CONG. REC. 8978 (1993) (statement of Rep. Clement) (“[Without 
protection] from discrimination or reprisal on the job as a result of their service, it will be 
increasingly difficult to recruit Americans to serve.”); see also 139 CONG. REC. 8977 (1993) 
(statement of Sen. Stump) (“This bill will help our forces to concentrate totally on the 
purpose of their mission.”). 
 16.  Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, New York, 75 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 65 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17.  38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2006). 
 18.  38 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (2006). 
 19.  38 U.S.C. § 4304 (2006). 
 20.  Duarte v. Agilent Techs. Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d. 1039, 1045 (D. Colo. 2005). 
 21.  38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
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their service.
22
 
II.  “REASONABLE EFFORTS” TO ACCOMMODATE AND “UNDUE HARDSHIP” 
UNDER USERRA 
To be reemployed, a returning service member must be able to 
perform the essential tasks of the position.
23
  Whether a task is “essential” 
depends on its relationship to the actual performance requirements of the 
position, and not merely the written job description.
24
  The definition of 
essential tasks is imported directly from the ADA.
25
  Honorably discharged 
service members with disabilities may no longer be able to perform the 
duties of the job they left when they were called to duty. 
Where an employee has incurred or aggravated a disability in the 
course of military service, USERRA requires that an employer make 
“reasonable efforts” to help the employee become qualified to perform the 
essential tasks of the reemployment position.
26
  If the returning service 
member still cannot perform the reemployment position despite the 
employer’s reasonable efforts to accommodate him or her, the employer is 
obligated to find a position of equivalent seniority, status and pay for which 
the veteran is qualified or could become qualified with the aid of the 
employer’s reasonable efforts.
27
  Regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Labor explain that the appropriate level of accommodation 
depends on situation-specific factors, including the nature of the service 
member’s disability and the job requirements of the position.
28
  The 
regulations state: “[s]uch accommodations may include placing the 
reemployed person in an alternate position; on ‘light duty’ status; 
modifying technology or equipment used in the job position; revising work 
practices; or, shifting job functions.”
29
  Additionally, the reemployment 
 
 22.  38 U.S.C. § 4312(e)(2)(A) (2006). 
 23.  38 U.S.C. § 4303(9) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012). 
 24.  Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 75,274 (Dec. 19, 2005) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1002) [hereinafter USERRA 
Regulations]. 
 25.  The ADA lists many factors that qualify a job function as “essential,” including 
whether: (1) the position exists to perform the function; (2) there are a limited number of 
employees to perform the job function; and/or (3) the incumbent is hired specifically for his 
or her ability to perform the function because it requires a high level of expertise.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(n)(2) (2012). 
 26.  20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012).   
 27.  38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(2)(A); USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, 9 NO. 
2 LEAVE & DISABILITY COORDINATION CENTER HANDBOOK NEWSL. 5 (Thompson Publ’g 
Grp., 2005) [hereinafter USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship]. 
 28.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,274-75. 
 29.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,277; 38 U.S.C. § 4303(9), (10), (15); § 
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position must be one that does not pose a risk of harm to either the service 
member performing it or colleagues.
30
 
 There is a limit, however, to the efforts that employers must make to 
accommodate returning disabled service members.  USERRA defines 
“reasonable efforts” by an employer as “actions,” such as training the 
employee, that do not place “undue hardship” on the employer.
31
  Section 
4303(15) of USERRA states that “[t]he term ‘undue hardship’, in the case 
of actions taken by an employer, means actions requiring significant 
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of [enumerated factors].”
32
  
These factors include: (1) the nature and cost of the action; (2) the overall 
financial resources required to take the action; and (3) the action’s effect on 
the expenses, resources, and operations of the facility when measured 
against the employer’s overall size.
33
 
Undue hardship, which delimits the scope of employers’ reasonable 
efforts to accommodate disabled veterans, requires clarification that courts 
have yet to provide.  This comment focuses on how courts are likely to 
interpret undue hardship and how courts should interpret the term. 
III.  FOR LACK OF A BETTER ALTERNATIVE, COURTS WILL LIKELY IMPORT 
ADA CASE LAW TO INTERPRET “UNDUE HARDSHIP” UNDER 
USERRA 
There is a strong possibility that courts will import ADA case law to 
interpret “undue hardship” under USERRA.  Both USERRA and the ADA 
require employers to accommodate disabled veterans up to the point that 
providing accommodations imposes an undue hardship on the employer.
34
  
In fact, USERRA’s definition of undue hardship mirrors that of the ADA.
35
  
The ADA defines undue hardship as an “action requiring significant 
difficulty or expense,” when considered in light of enumerated factors—the 
same factors listed under the USERRA definition.
36
  Additionally, under 
both acts, undue hardship is an affirmative defense for which the employer 
 
4313(a)(3) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 103–65, pt. 1, at 31 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103–158, at 53 
(1993). 
 30.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,277. 
 31.  38 U.S.C. § 4303(10); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(i) (2012). 
 32.  38 U.S.C. § 4303(15). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Returning Veterans, 24 NO. 11 EMPL. PRAC. 
UPDATE 1, 4 (Thompson Publ’g Grp., Nov. 2011). 
 35. See  Green, supra note 12, at 238 (noting that "the USERRA and ADA have 
basically the same definition of undue hardship”). 
 36.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2006).  ADA undue hardship factors are delineated in 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2006), while USERRA undue hardship considerations are 
outlined in 38 U.S.C. § 4303(15) (2006). 
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bears the burden of proof.
37
 
Courts have interpreted terms within reemployment protection laws in 
light of their predecessors.  For example, the term “reasonable 
accommodation” was one of a number of provisions that the ADA 
imported from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA’s predecessor; 
courts have interpreted the terms identically under both Acts.
38
  Similarly, 
case precedent interpreting the language of USERRA’s predecessor, the 
VRRA, is considered authoritative to the extent that USERRA’s language 
parallels the VRRA.
39
 
At least facially, the ADA seems to be a reasonable model for 
USERRA’s disability provisions, as it shares a general purpose with 
USERRA.  Like USERRA, the ADA is primarily an anti-discrimination 
law; Congress passed the ADA to “provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”
40
  Reemployment is also a fundamental goal of the ADA.  
Just as USERRA seeks to reintegrate veterans into the workplace, the ADA 
seeks to “bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social 
mainstream of American life.”
41
  Similarly, the ADA requires employers to 
take affirmative steps to accommodate disabled employees if such an 
accommodation would eliminate a barrier to employment.
42
  Hence, the two 
acts provide protections for two different, yet overlapping, classes of 
people:  disabled Americans and U.S. veterans. 
Many practitioners believe that courts will interpret undue hardship 
under USERRA in the same way that they have interpreted the term under 
the ADA.
43
  Lawyers within the Department of Labor (DOL), the agency 
 
 37.  Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(2) (2006) with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006); 
see also H. Craig Manson, The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act of 1994, 47 A.F. L. REV. 55, 70 (1999) (“USERRA provides an employer with three 
affirmative defenses in an action to enforce a service member/employee’s reemployment 
rights . . . [including] undue hardship . . . .”). 
 38.  Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 39.  See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 19-21 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2449, 2454 (stating the House Committee’s opinion that the body of case law that evolved 
under the VRRA should apply in interpreting USERRA’s provisions to the extent that it is 
consistent with the VRRAt); Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 34, at 6 (“In USERRA actions, 
the VRRA precedent is considered authoritative to the extent the latter’s statutory language 
parallels the former.”); see also Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 
2004) (stating that courts may rely on the case law developed under the VRRA in 
interpreting USERRA).  
 40.  Vande Zande, 44 F.3d 538 at 541 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a), (b)(1)). 
 41.  H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
304; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). 
 42.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006). 
 43. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 9, at 512 (predicting that an exception to the general 
reemployment guarantee in USERRA is “likely to be interpreted in a similar fashion” as the 
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responsible for enforcing USERRA, share this view.
44
  Even USERRA’s 
National Counsel believes that courts will import ADA case law to 
USERRA in interpreting undue hardship because courts have “no better 
alternative.”
45
  But because no case has interpreted undue hardship under 
USERRA, lawyers admit “it is very difficult to speak definitively about 
how [the term] will be construed and applied by the courts.”
46
  In addition 
to the absence of case law, there is also no Memorandum of Understanding 
between the EEOC and the DOL regarding this issue.
47
  The first court 
forced to interpret undue hardship under USERRA will have to address to 
what extent, if at all, ADA case law should be imported to inform the term. 
IV. COURTS SHOULD NOT RELY ON ADA CASE LAW TO INTERPRET 
“UNDUE HARDSHIP” UNDER USERRA 
The undue hardship provision of USERRA should be interpreted more 
narrowly than under the ADA to reflect the differences in: (1) the text of 
the definitions in the respective Acts; (2) what the undue hardship 
provision delimits (reasonable accommodation versus reasonable efforts); 
(3) administrative guidance regarding interpretation of the Acts; and (4) the 
statutes’ specific purposes (accommodating disability versus promptly 
reemploying veterans). 
A.  The definitions of undue hardship under the ADA and USERRA differ in 
a small but significant way 
Although USERRA directly borrows the ADA’s definition of undue 
hardship, there is a key difference between the acts’ first phrases.  Under 
the ADA, the definition of undue hardship reads:  “In determining whether 
an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, 
 
ADA);.  see also Fernandez, supra note 10, at 882 (explaining that the similarities between 
USERRA and the ADA make it likely that undue hardship will be interpreted similarly 
under both acts); Back from Military Service and Disabled: Special Treatment Needed, 18 
NO. 5 ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSL. 1 (Thompson Publ’g Grp., 2007) (describing the 
general perception that “‘[u]ndue hardship’ means the same thing in USERRA that it does in 
the ADA”). 
 44.  See USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, supra note 27 (stating one 
DOL lawyer’s assumption that undue hardship will be interpreted similarly under USERRA 
and the ADA).  
 45.  Interview with Matt Levin, Department of Labor (DOL) National USERRA 
Counsel (Dec. 8, 2011).  Mr. Levin believes courts will use ADA case law to interpret 
undue hardship under USERRA because there is no other definitive source of guidance;  
there has not been significant case law interpreting the term in the USERRA context. 
 46.  USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, supra note 27. 
 47.  USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, supra note 27. 
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factors to be considered include (i) the nature and cost of the 
accommodation needed under this chapter . . . .”
48
  In contrast, the 
definition of undue hardship under USERRA states: “[t]he term ‘undue 
hardship’, in the case of actions taken by an employer, means actions 
requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of (A) 
the nature and cost of the action needed under this chapter . . . .”
49
  
USERRA’s use of the word “action” implicitly references its conception of 
“reasonable efforts,” which USERRA defines as “actions required of an 
employer.”
50
  The difference between the ADA’s explicit reference to 
“accommodation” and USERRA’s implicit reference to “reasonable 
efforts” should affect how courts interpret undue hardship under the two 
laws. 
B.  Because reasonable effort under USERRA imposes a heavier burden on 
employers than reasonable accommodation does under the ADA, these 
terms alter the context in which undue hardship should be evaluated 
USERRA regulations make clear that “reasonable efforts” are 
different  than “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA.
51
  USERRA’s 
definition places a heavier burden on employers than the ADA.  In addition 
to requiring employers to modify technology or equipment used in the job 
position, revise work practices, or shift an employee’s job functions,
52
 
USERRA’s standard of “reasonable efforts” requires an employer to train 
and retrain an employee with a disability to perform his escalator 
position—the job that he had previously held, after including any 
promotions that he would reasonably be expected to have attained if he 
continued working for his employer instead of serving in the military.
53
  If 
the employee cannot perform the job even with this training, the employer 
will be required to reemploy the service member in a position that is 
equivalent in seniority, status, and pay to his escalator position, provided 
that he is qualified for that equivalent position.
54
  At this stage, the 
employer again must help the employee become qualified for that 
equivalent position.
55
  If such a position is unavailable, then the disabled 
 
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 49.  38 U.S.C § 4303(15) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,277. 
 52.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,270-71; 38 U.S.C. § 4303(9), (10),  
(15) (2006); § 4313(a)(3) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 103–65, pt. I, at 31 (1993); S. REP. NO. 
103–158, at 53 (1993). 
 53.  38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(2)(A). 
 54.  20 C.F.R. § 1002.197 (2005). 
 55.  Id. 
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employee, consistent with the particular circumstances of his case, is 
entitled to a position that approximates the equivalent position in terms of 
seniority, status, and pay.
56
  Thus, unlike the ADA’s “reasonable 
accommodation,” which does not require an employer to find a new job for 
the disabled employee,
57
 USERRA’s “reasonable efforts” to accommodate 
an employee’s disability may require an employer to search out and offer a 
job that the disabled service member can perform.
58
  To this end, employers 
have the burden of presenting the returning disabled service member with a 
list of all of the positions for which he or she may be qualified.
59
 
There are further differences between an employer’s obligations under 
USERRA and under the ADA.  Under the ADA, courts interpret reasonable 
accommodation as limited by other employees’ settled expectations.  In 
U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the Supreme Court held that an accommodation 
that infringes on an employer’s seniority system is not reasonable because 
the “typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by 
creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.”
60
  
U.S. Airways strongly suggests that a “reasonable” accommodation under 
the ADA cannot require giving a disabled employee a position held by a 
more senior employee.  Additionally, although “‘reasonable 
accommodation’ may include . . . [an employee’s] reassignment to a vacant 
position,”
61
 courts have held that an employer is not required to reassign a 
disabled employee to a vacant position if that employer has a policy of 
hiring the most qualified person for the job.
62
  This interpretation of 
“reasonable accommodation” essentially requires disabled individuals to 
compete with the general applicant pool for open positions. 
Under USERRA, however, an employer may not refuse to reemploy a 
returning service member on the basis that another employee replaced him 
during his absence.
63
  Fryer v. A.S.A.P. Fire & Safety Corp. illustrates this 
 
 56.  Sharon M. Erwin, When the Troops Come Home: Returning Reservists, Employers 
and the Law, 19 HEALTH LAW. 1, 10-11 (2007). 
 57.  Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[E]mployers 
need not create a new job or even modify an essential function of a vacant job in order to 
make it suitable for the disabled employee”). 
 58.  Martin, supra note 9, at 510-512. 
 59.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,261-62. 
 60.  U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 392 (2002). 
 61.  42 U.S.C.§ 12111(9) (2006). 
 62.  See Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the ADA 
does not require an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position 
when it would violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most 
qualified candidate). 
 63.  See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.139(a) (2012) for a codification of this scenario in the 
regulations. See also Murphree v. Commc’ns Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704, 710 
(E.D. La. 2006) (rejecting the employer’s argument that hiring of a replacement employee 
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principle.  In Fryer, an employee who was working for A.S.A.P Fire & 
Safety Corporation (ASAP) selling sprinklers was called to military duty.
64
  
Upon his return from service, ASAP claimed he could not be reemployed 
because his position had been filled; instead, ASAP rehired Fryer as a 
sprinkler helper.
65
  The sprinkler helper position, however, did not include 
the same benefits or opportunity for commission as his previous position.
66
  
Despite ASAP’s reemployment of Fryer, ASAP was required to terminate 
or transfer the replacement employee in order to reemploy Fryer in his 
previous position; therefore, the court held that hiring Fryer as a sprinkler 
helper did not meet USERRA’s strict reemployment requirements.
67
  This 
case is not an anomaly. USERRA’s regulations explicitly state that an 
employer’s obligation to reemploy a returning service member may require 
terminating the employee who was hired to replace the service member 
when the service member left for military duty.
68
 
Additionally, through legal victories, employers have limited the 
scope of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 
They have not done so under USERRA.  The ADA does not require 
employers to create a part-time position to accommodate a disabled 
employee, or to displace a temporary worker to accommodate a disabled 
worker.
69
  An employer also has no obligation to create a “light duty” 
position for a disabled employee under the ADA.
70
  Courts have further 
held that “an accommodation that would result in other employees having 
 
on a permanent basis constitutes changed circumstances that foreclose an employer’s 
obligation to reemploy a returning veteran). 
 64.  Fryer v. A.S.A.P. Fire & Safety Corp., 680 F. Supp. 2d 317, 320-21 (D. Mass. 
2010). 
 65.  Id. at 321-22. 
 66.  Id. at 322. 
 67.  Id. at 327. 
 68.  20 C.F.R. § 1002.139(a) (2012).  Note, however, that USERRA requires that in 
reemploying returning employee-service members, employers must not displace or deprive 
the benefits of other employee-service members in a way that unlawfully infringes upon 
their rights under Title V, Veterans’ Preference.  38 U.S.C. § 4312(g) (2006); 5 U.S.C. § 
2108 (2006).  
 69.  See Dalton v. Subaru–Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that an employer is not required to create new positions for disabled employees under the 
ADA); Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employer 
was not required to create a part-time position for a disabled employee where the employer 
had already eliminated all part-time positions); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 318 
n. 11 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an employer was not required to reemploy a 
recovering employee on a part-time basis). 
 70.  See Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating 
that an employer is not required to create light duty jobs to accommodate disabled 
employees); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that an employer is under no duty to keep a disabled employee “on unpaid leave indefinitely 
until a suitable position opens up”). 
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to work harder or longer” is unreasonable under the ADA.
71
  These 
holdings all run contrary to USERRA, under which an employer may be 
required to create part-time and light-duty positions and displace or 
terminate other workers to reemploy a disabled service member.
72
  Case 
law interpreting “reasonable accommodation” therefore creates fewer 
protections for disabled veterans under the ADA than case law interpreting 
“reasonable efforts” to accommodate veterans under USERRA. 
C.  Undue hardship analysis under the ADA is entangled with analysis of 
the term “reasonable accommodation” 
As the above sections have indicated, under the ADA, “undue 
hardship” delimits the extent of “reasonable accommodation,” a term not 
used in USERRA.  Under the ADA, a cost-benefit analysis is required at 
two levels of inquiry: first, to determine whether the accommodation is 
“reasonable” and second, if it imposes an “undue hardship.”  The cost-
benefit analysis for each inquiry is different.  To be reasonable, an 
accommodation’s costs must not be “clearly disproportionate to the 
benefits it will produce.”
73
  These costs are not only financial, but may also 
include actions detrimental to other employees.
74
  The reasonableness 
inquiry is a “generalized” one that requires looking at costs and benefits in 
the “run of cases.”
75
  The employee must identify an accommodation that 
achieves a rough proportionality between costs and benefits.
76
 
By contrast, the undue hardship inquiry is confined to the operations 
of the specific employer.
77
  In Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, 
one of the few cases to explicitly state how courts should analyze undue 
hardship, the court explained that judges should “undertake a refined 
 
 71.  Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094.  See also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that an accommodation that infringes on the rights of other employees is not 
reasonable); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 1172 (1996) (stating that an accommodation that imposes undue hardship on the 
operation of an employer’s program is not required under the ADA); Milton v. Scrivner, 
Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995) (“An accommodation that would result in other 
employees having to work harder or longer hours is not required.”). 
 72.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,274-75. 
 73.  Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995).  Green, 
supra note 12, at 229.  
74.  U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002). 
 75.  Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
 76.  Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139. 
 77.  See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995)  
(assessing the factors to be evaluated in determining whether an otherwise-reasonable 
accommodation would impose undue hardship and stating that the financial condition of an 
employer is only one consideration). 
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analysis” and consider both “the industry to which the employer belongs as 
well as the individual characteristics of the particular defendant-
employer.”
78
  To prove undue hardship, employers need not show that an 
accommodation would drive them to the brink of insolvency.
79
  They also 
need not measure the costs and benefits of the proposed accommodation 
with “mathematical precision.”
80
  Instead, employers need only use 
“common sense” in balancing costs and benefits in light of the listed 
factors in the definition.
81
 
But despite these distinctions in the two concepts, in practice courts’ 
analyses of whether an accommodation is reasonable and whether the 
accommodation creates an undue hardship under the ADA are nearly 
identical.  The Borkowski court itself acknowledged that, after an employee 
has identified a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, “the difference 
between . . . [demonstrating] the unreasonableness of the accommodation 
and demonstrating that the accommodation imposes an undue hardship 
becomes blurred.”
82
  Employers, armed with more information than 
employees concerning industry practices and their own organizations in 
particular, tend to make a barrage of arguments about the effect that an 
accommodation will have on their company.  Courts do not draw a bright 
line between what information is sufficiently specific to the employer to 
constitute undue hardship, and what information is general enough to 
address whether the proposed accommodation is reasonable in the general 
“run of cases.”
83
  In a line of cases including Hall v. USPS, in which the 
Sixth Circuit stated that an accommodation is not reasonable if it places an 
undue burden on the employer, courts have collapsed the question of 
whether an undue hardship exists into that of whether an accommodation is 
reasonable.
84
 
In U.S. Airways the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the distinction 
 
 78.  Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139.  Note that the legislative history of the ADA equates 
“undue hardship” to “unduly costly.”  S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989).  Borkowski places 
this inquiry in the context of assessing the employer’s specific circumstances. 
 79.  S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31.  Congress rejected a provision that would have defined 
an undue hardship as one that threatened the continued existence of the employer.  Id. 
 80.  Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 140. 
 81.  Id.; Green, supra note 12, at 230.  
 82.  Green, supra note 12, at 230 (citing Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 137). 
 83.  U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002). 
 84.  Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Sch. Bd. v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (determining that an accommodation is not 
reasonable if it imposes on the employer “undue financial and administrative burdens,” or 
requires a “fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program”) (citing Southeastern 
Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 & 412 (1979)); cf. U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 402 
(noting that ordinary summary judgment principles reconcile reasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship).  
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between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.  The Supreme 
Court explained that  
a demand for an effective accommodation could prove 
unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, 
but on fellow employees . . . because it will lead to dismissals, 
relocations, or modification of employee benefits to which an 
employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of the 
business itself, may be relatively indifferent.
85
   
In U.S. Airways, the court established assessments of reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship as separate, consecutive inquiries, and 
asserted that the reasonable accommodation inquiry requires examining a 
broader set of costs than does undue hardship, which focuses on the 
accommodation’s effects on the specific employer. 
 Even the Court’s decision in U.S. Airways, however, could not 
disentangle the analysies of reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship.  The district court in U.S. Airways reasoned that altering U.S. 
Airways’ seniority system in order to transfer an employee with a bad back 
to a less physically demanding position “would result in undue hardship to 
both the company and its nondisabled employees.”
86
  The Supreme Court 
then used the same facts and a similar analysis to hold that an 
accommodation that requires altering a seniority system is not 
“reasonable.”
87
  Following this logic, the Eastern District of Texas cited 
U.S. Airways and other cases in Bennett v. Calabrasian for the proposition 
that the analysis regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship 
is the same.
88
  The Bennett court failed to heed the distinction in the cost-
benefit analyses required by the two terms, suggesting in a footnote that 
“undue hardship exists if [an] employer ‘incurs anything more than a de 
minimis cost’ [in providing it],” hence opening the door for virtually any 
hardship to be deemed “undue.”
89
  The Bennett court employed undue 
hardship analysis to support its holding that changing the time of a disabled 
 
 85.  U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 399-400. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 405. 
 88.  See Bennett v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 815, 836-37 (E.D. Tex. 
2004) (asserting that undue hardship analysis and reasonable accommodation analysis are 
nearly identical).   
 89.  Bennett, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (citing Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 
F.3d 495, 500 (2001)).  Note that the court’s citation to Bruff in this instance is questionable.  
Bruff is a Title VII case regarding religious accommodation, which imposes very different 
standards than the ADA.  The court’s willingness to impose such a minimal burden on the 
employer to show undue hardship further reveals why importing the term to USERRA 
would decrease protections for disabled service members. 
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plaintiff’s shift was not a reasonable accommodation.
90
 
Because what little ADA case law interpreting undue hardship exists 
is inextricably entangled with analysis of reasonable accommodation, using 
this case law to interpret USERRA would be unhelpful at best, and 
counterproductive at worst.  The way in which courts have narrowly 
construed reasonable accommodation runs counter to USERRA case law, 
which imposes a comparatively heavier obligation on employers to 
accommodate returning service members who incur disabilities while 
serving the nation.  This argument is further developed in Section F, infra.  
Importing ADA case law would risk importing the inapplicable standard 
for reasonable accommodation into USERRA under the guise of undue 
hardship. 
D.  Undue hardship is contextualized within different proof structures 
under the ADA and USERRA 
Importing ADA case law to interpret “undue hardship” under 
USERRA would also be inappropriate because the proof structures 
encompassing undue hardship under the two Acts are different.  Under 
USERRA, after the plaintiff has met the three initial elements
91
 required for 
reemployment and has shown that the employee incurred or aggravated a 
disability during service, the employer must make reasonable efforts to 
accommodate him or her or else bear the burden of proving undue 
hardship.
92
  USERRA regulations emphasize this burden, stating that 
“employer defenses . . . [including undue hardship] are affirmative ones, 
and the employer carries the burden to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that any one or more of these defenses is applicable.”
93
  In 
contrast, under the ADA, the employee has the burden of production to 
identify a plausible accommodation that would allow him or her to perform 
 
 90.  Bennett, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  Conversely, in Riel v. Elec. Data Sys., 99 F.3d 
678, 681, 683 (5th Cir. 1996), the court held that neither adjusting a disabled employee’s 
deadlines nor transferring him to a teaching position without such deadlines was 
unreasonable “in the run of cases.”  The court chastised the employer for attempting to place 
the burden of proof of undue hardship on the employee by refusing to plead the affirmative 
defense and then attacking the employee’s proposed accommodations as unreasonable by 
using evidence specific to the employer’s circumstances.  Id.  Even the court in this case, 
however, conceded that “the terms ‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘undue hardship’ often 
go hand-in-hand,” and that “[t]he evidence of reasonableness ‘in the run of cases’ and undue 
hardship will often be overlapping and resist neat compartmentalization.”  Id. 
 91.  See supra section II. 
 92.  38 U.S.C. § 4303(10) (2006); 43 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(2) (2006); Green, supra note 12, 
at 229.  
 93.  20 C.F.R. § 1002.139(d) (2012). 
GINGRANDE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:54 PM 
2013] THE IMPORT OF UNDUE HARDSHIP 1127 
 
the essential functions of the job.
94
  After the employee makes the initial 
showing that a reasonable accommodation exists, the employer can refute 
the reasonableness of the accommodation, and/or assert undue hardship as 
an affirmative defense.
95
 
A sampling of ADA case law shows that plaintiffs’ claims are likely 
to be rejected at the reasonable accommodation stage of inquiry, when the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
 
  Hence, courts have rarely needed to 
address whether accommodation poses an undue hardship on an employer.  
Engaging in proper undue hardship analysis, where the burden is on the 
employer to prove that an accommodation is unduly costly given its own 
specific finances, among other factors, would likely result in more plaintiff 
victories (since employers haled into court are often large, profitable 
companies). The ADA’s framework of reasonable accommodation instead 
precludes these plaintiff victories, since courts deem accommodations 
unreasonable in the general run of cases without ever assessing whether the 
accommodation would be unduly costly to the particular employer.
96
 
In contrast, under USERRA’s proof structure, the burden is on the 
employer to prove that it could not accommodate a veteran through 
reasonable efforts.  To prove that a veteran cannot be reemployed, the 
employer would have to successfully argue that its “reasonable efforts” 
proved futile in three different contexts: (1) the effort to train and retrain 
the disabled veteran to perform his previous job; (2) the effort to help a 
veteran become able to perform an equivalent position (of like seniority, 
status, and pay); and (3) the effort to accommodate the veteran in a position 
that most closely approximates the equivalent position (which may include 
a less-skilled or lesser-paying position).
97
  Hence, while undue hardship 
analysis is rarely conducted under the ADA because courts rule against 
plaintiffs before even reaching the question of undue hardship, under 
USERRA, undue hardship analysis has rarely been conducted because 
“there typically has been something the employer can do to accommodate 
and reemploy a returning disabled veteran.”
98
 
 
 94.  Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  The ADA framework, which places the burden on employees of proving that an 
accommodation is “reasonable,” has led critics to argue that ADA case law demonstrates “a 
recurring attraction toward rules that avoid merit evaluation of the burden accommodation 
places on the employer.”  Cheryl L. Anderson, What is “Because of the Disability” under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the 
Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 377-80 (2006).Ω 
 97.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,273; 20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012). 
 98.  Interview with Matt Levin, Department of Labor (DOL) National USERRA 
Counsel (Dec. 8, 2011).  Mr. Levin partly attributes this result to the fact that the DOL is 
aggressive in pursuing USERRA claims that it deems meritorious.  Under USERRA, 
returning veterans can file a claim with the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (an 
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USERRA’s current framework—under which the burden to prove the 
reasonableness of efforts to accommodate is on the employer, not the 
employee—is consistent with the goal of reemploying disabled service 
members.  Contaminating undue hardship analysis under USERRA with 
the ADA’s interpretation of reasonable accommodation would undermine 
this framework due to the burden-shifting proof structure it would import. 
E.  Regulatory guidance suggests that ADA interpretations of undue 
hardship should not be imported to USERRA 
USERRA regulations imply that ADA case law should not be 
imported to assess undue hardship.  The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) 
has the statutory authority to enforce and promulgate regulations of 
USERRA.
99
  In 2005, the DOL published final regulations implementing 
USERRA that became effective on January 18, 2006.
100
  In the regulations, 
the DOL discusses situations in which the ADA might be imported to 
USERRA.  One example regards an interpretation of what makes someone 
“qualified” for reemployment.  USERRA defines “qualified” as “having 
the ability to perform the essential tasks of the position.”
101
  USERRA’s 
legislative history does not reveal whether “essential tasks” is defined the 
same way as “essential functions” under the ADA; however, the DOL 
proactively adopted the regulatory definition of “essential functions” under 
the ADA.
102
  The DOL explained that this change was adopted for purposes 
of “regulatory consistency.”
103
 
While this argument for “regulatory consistency” might have opened 
the door to importing other terms from the ADA to USERRA, the DOL 
emphasized that certain ADA terms should not be imported to USERRA.  
For example, the DOL explicitly rejected the suggestion that it adopt and 
apply the ADA’s concept and interpretation of reasonable accommodation 
 
agency of the DOL). If the DOL concludes that the complaint is valid, it shall “attempt to 
resolve the complaint by making reasonable efforts to ensure that the person or entity named 
in the complaint complies with the relevant provisions” of the Act. 38 U.S.C. § 4322(d) 
(2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.290 (2012).  If the employer does not comply, the 
claimant can request that the DOL refer the complaint to the Secretary of Labor, who may 
bring a civil action on the complainant’s behalf.  38 U.S.C. § 4322(e).  The claimant also 
retains the right to privately litigate the claim.  Id. 
 99.  38 U.S.C. § 4322 (2006). 
 100.  Jonathan A. Segal, Questions and Answers about DOL’s Final USERRA Orders, 
52 PRAC. LAW. 23 (2006); 70 Fed. Reg. 75,246 (Dec. 19, 2005) (codified at 20 C.F.R. 
1002). 
 101.  38 U.S.C. § 4303(9) (2006). 
 102.  USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75, 274. 
 103.  Id. at 27, 274. 
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to USERRA.
104
  The DOL first noted that USERRA does not include the 
term reasonable accommodation.
105
  The DOL then went on to state: 
In addition, although interpretations of the ADA may be useful in 
providing some guidance under USERRA’s provisions regarding 
accommodating an employee with a disability, the Department is 
reluctant to adopt extensive portions of complex regulations 
promulgated under other statutes not administered or enforced by 
the Department, and notes that there are significant differences in 
the coverage of the two statutes.
106
 
Because the DOL did not specifically apply this reasoning to address 
whether courts should rely on ADA case law when interpreting the term 
“undue hardship” under USERRA, the question remains unanswered.  
However, given how intertwined the concept of reasonable accommodation 
is with undue hardship under the ADA,
107
 the DOL’s admonishment that 
the term “reasonable accommodation” should not be imported to USERRA 
supports the argument that courts should also not import ADA case law to 
interpret undue hardship under USERRA. 
F.  Importing ADA case law to interpret undue hardship under USERRA 
would contravene USERRA’s underlying purpose 
Importing ADA case law to interpret undue hardship under USERRA 
would be anathema to USERRA’s purpose.  The legislative history and 
purpose of USERRA support a narrow reading of undue hardship.  In Coffy 
v. Republic Steel Corp., the Supreme Court declared that the Act upon 
which USERRA was based, the VRRA, “is to be liberally construed for the 
benefit of the returning veteran.”
108
  USERRA is a recodification of the 
VRRA intended to expand veterans’ reemployment protections and ease 
service members back into civilian life when they return from service.
109
  
Courts look to USERRA’s underlying purpose in interpreting the statute 
and construe USERRA to serve the legislative goal of enabling individuals 
to fulfill military obligations without bearing the loss of civilian 
employment.
110
  The DOL has given regulatory authority to this liberal 
construction of USERRA.  The preamble to the USERRA regulations states 
 
 104.  Id. at 75, 277. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See supra pt. III.2. 
 108.  Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980). 
 109.  38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (2006). 
 110.  See McGuire v. United Parcel Serv., 152 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1998) (“USERRA 
is to be liberally construed in favor of those who served their country.”). 
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that “the interpretive maxim” that applies when construing the Act is the 
Supreme Court’s proclamation that it “is to be liberally construed for the 
benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of 
great need . . . [a]nd no practice of employers . . . can cut down the service 
adjustment benefits which Congress has secured the veteran under the 
Act.”
111
 
Courts interpreting USERRA inherit the task of construing the 
separate provisions of the Act as “parts of an organic whole.”
112
  In 
interpreting each part, courts should afford the greatest protective benefit to 
the veteran as the “harmonious interplay of the separate provisions 
permits.”
113
  To achieve this goal, courts should interpret reemployment 
protections broadly and affirmative defenses narrowly.  Some courts have 
followed this trend in holding that a service member’s right to be promptly 
reemployed takes precedence over an employer’s interest to conduct pre-
employment tests of the employee’s physical fitness.
114
  Other courts have 
followed this trend in holding that the only factor that should prevent a 
returning veteran from being “qualified” for an employment position is 
whether the veteran has exhibited dangerous or extreme behavior.
115
  Still 
other courts have continued this pattern by holding that a veteran does not 
waive his rights under USERRA by refusing an offer of reemployment that 
includes anything less than proper seniority, pay and lost wages and 
benefits.
116
  Whereas importing the ADA’s interpretation of undue hardship 
would significantly broaden the employer’s affirmative defense under 
USERRA, interpreting undue hardship narrowly would follow the above 
trend and would limit the circumstances in which employers would be able 
to deny reemployment to returning disabled veterans. 
G.  “Changed circumstances”: an affirmative defense that undue hardship 
should model 
A narrow interpretation of undue hardship would also comport with 
how courts construe other affirmative defenses under USERRA.  Take, for 
 
 111.  Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946); see also 
Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1977) (citing Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 
285); King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 n.9 (1991) (same). 
 112.  Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Petty v. Metro. Gov’t, 538 F.3d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 115.  Lapine v. Town of Wellesley, 167 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d, 304 
F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 116.  U.S. v. Nevada, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1245 (D. Nev. 2011) (citing Stevens v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 699 F.2d 314, 316 (6th Cir. 1983); Hanna v. Am. Motors Corp., 724 
F.2d 1300, 1312–13 (7th Cir. 1984)).  
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example, courts’ interpretation of the statutory exception of “changed 
circumstances.”  This affirmative defense excuses an employer from 
reinstating a veteran when the employer’s circumstances have changed so 
much that reemployment is “impossible or unreasonable.”
117
  Courts have 
held that “changed circumstances” is a very limited exception to be applied 
only where reinstatement would require “creation of a useless job or where 
there has been a reduction in the work force that reasonably would have 
included the veteran.”
118
 
While there are no cases interpreting undue hardship under USERRA, 
there are cases assessing “changed circumstances” that could provide a 
model for how courts should interpret the undue hardship defense.  In Loeb 
v. Kivo, the employer refused to rehire a returning veteran because it 
claimed that his position as salesman no longer existed.
119
  Demand for the 
company’s product had increased, and because customers were coming to 
the company plant to place orders, the employer reasoned that there was no 
need for salesmen to go door-to-door making sales.
120
  The Loeb court, 
however, held that this reasoning did not meet the employer’s burden to 
show changed circumstances.  The court rationalized that there was still 
sales work to be done at the plant—there were still “[samples] to be made 
up and displayed, customers to be dealt with, and orders to be taken.”
121
  As 
a result, the employer was required to reemploy the veteran. 
This case can be reframed within the context of disability.  Assuming 
instead that the plaintiff in Loeb was a veteran who returned from service 
with a disability that inhibited him from traveling to customers’ homes, his 
disability would arguably obviate the need for his services as a salesman.  
The employer could argue that it should not be required to “create a useless 
job” just to rehire the veteran.
122
  But applying the reasoning in Loeb, a 
court could reject the employer’s defense and find that, based on the 
specific circumstances of this employer, the employer was required to 
reemploy the veteran.  After all, there were still sales to be made in the 
store, customers to be dealt with, and orders to be taken.  By this logic, 
 
 117.  38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 118.  Wrigglesworth v. Brumbaugh, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1136 (W.D. Mich. 2000) 
(quoting Davis v. Halifax Cnty. Sch. Sys., 508 F. Supp. 966, 968 (E.D.N.C. 1981)) 
(discussing the purpose of the VRRA); see also Duarte v. Agilent Techs. Inc., 366 F. Supp. 
2d 1039, 1046 (D. Colo. 2005) (noting that the legislative history of USERRA indicates that 
the VRRA’s purpose and case law is to be applied when interpreting USERRA’s 
provisions). 
 119.  Loeb v. Kivo, 169 F.2d 346, 349 (S.D.N.Y 1948). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. See also Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 36, at 3 (discussing Loeb further). 
 122.  Such an argument would follow the logic of Wrigglesworth, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 
1126. 
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finding or creating a new job for the disabled veteran—for example by 
changing his responsibilities and reducing the need for travel by allowing 
him to work in-house—would not create an undue hardship for the 
employer, since there was enough benefit to be derived from his 
reemployment to justify the costs of the position. 
Other courts assessing the changed circumstances defense have held 
that even when an employer is recovering from a “financial crisis,” it is not 
enough to justify failure to reemploy the veteran.  In Van Doren v. Van 
Doren Laundry Service, the court held that reemploying a veteran is not 
unreasonable or impossible even if doing so may result in “some loss of 
efficiency or economy of operation.”
123
  While in the context of the ADA, 
such costs to an employer may be enough to prove undue hardship,
124
 Van 
Doren suggests that courts conducting a cost-benefit analysis under 
USERRA should give little weight to costs associated with the employer’s 
efficiency and operations.  Even when the employer is financially unstable, 
such costs should not outweigh the great benefits of reemploying 
veterans.
125
  USERRA itself is a testament to those benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts faced with the challenge of interpreting undue hardship under 
USERRA should not look to undue hardship cases under the ADA for 
guidance, despite their like purposes and the similarity of their definitions 
of the term.  Importing ADA case law to USERRA would not only defy 
what the term delimits in both Acts and contravene what little guidance the 
DOL regulations provide, it would also undermine the strong protections 
that USERRA provides to America’s disabled service members.  With 
more veterans returning from war with disabilities than ever before and an 
endemic problem of unemployment that disparately afflicts veterans, it is 
particularly important to provide these service members with the 
reemployment protections they deserve.  Instead of basing decisions on the 
ADA when analyzing the undue hardship defense, courts should look to 
other affirmative defenses under USERRA, such as “changed 
circumstances,” for guidance.  Accordingly, courts should restrict the scope 
 
 123.  Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Serv., 162 F.2d 1007, 1009 (3d Cir. 1947). 
 124. See Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that employers 
are not required to incur the loss in efficiency that would result from hiring a disabled 
employee instead of the most qualified applicant for a position). 
 125.  See Kay v. Gen. Cable Corp., 144 F.2d 653, 655 (3d Cir. 1944) (interpreting 
USERRA’s predecessor, the VRRA, and stating “[a]ccepting the [employer’s] contention 
that there would be some loss of efficiency and possibly some additional expense involved, 
more than that is needed to justify refusal to reinstate a person within the protection of the 
Act.”). 
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of the undue hardship defense.  Doing so would support the Act’s 
important purpose of promptly reemploying those who serve our country. 
 
